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E. Donald Elliott is Florence Rogatz Visiting Professor of Law, Yale Law School, and 
formerly EPA Assistant Administrator and General Counsel, 1989-1991.
A number of bills have been introduced in recent years to put a price on carbon via a federal carbon tax.1 These proposals generally proceed from the implicit 
assumption that the federal government in general, and 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in par-
ticular, does not already have such authority. That is incor-
rect. Under a federal statute that has been on the books 
since 1952,2 EPA could impose a carbon “tax” any time an 
administration in power is willing to do so. That is because 
a charge for using the public’s air to dispose of carbon diox-
ide and other wastes is technically not a tax, but rather a 
“user fee.”3
The confusion stems from a 1990 legal opinion written 
by the present author when he was EPA General Counsel,4 
which ironically was intended to increase EPA’s use of trad-
able permits and other economic incentives to regulate pol-
1. For a summary of pending carbon tax proposals and policy arguments pro 
and con, see Congressional Research Service, R45625, Attaching a 
Price to Greenhouse Gas Emissions With a Carbon Tax or Emissions 
Fee: Considerations and Potential Impacts (2019), available at https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45625.pdf.
2. Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 31 U.S.C. §9701, quoted and dis-
cussed infra.
3. See discussion infra notes 20-30.
4. Memorandum from E. Donald Elliott, Assistant Administrator and General 
Counsel, U.S. EPA, on Existing Authority to Use Economic Incentives to 
Regulate Pollution, to William K. Reilly, Administrator, U.S. EPA (July 13, 
1990).
lution. It is time to set the record straight that EPA does 
have existing authority to impose a reasonable user fee 
on releases of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
(GHGs), as well as other pollutants, any time that it has the 
political will to do so.
For many purposes, tradable permits are admittedly 
superior to emission fees for regulating environmental 
pollutants,5 and I have been a longtime advocate of trad-
able pollution rights. However, in some circumstances, 
charging fees for emitting pollution into the public’s air 
can be attractive. This is particularly true in view of our 
country’s structural deficit and national debt of $22.6 tril-
lion and rising; a user fee on releasing carbon pollution into 
the atmosphere could raise billions of dollars annually for 
the U.S. Treasury,6 as opposed to giving away the right to 
pollute for free.7 In addition, the old adage “nothing is cer-
tain but death and taxes” captures the perception that fees 
paid to the government are likely to remain constant or go 
up, while the prices of permits fluctuate.8 That is crucial 
because to date, the problem of addressing climate change9 
is dominated by substituting one type of lower-emitting 
5. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Effluent Charges: A Critique, 6 Canadian J. Econ. 
512-28 (1973), reprinted in Benefit-Cost and Policy Analysis 1974 
(Richard Zeckhauser et al. eds., Aldine Publishing Co. 1975).
6. A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that 23 
federal agencies charged more than 3,600 different user fees and collected 
nearly $64 billion in fiscal year 2010. U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, 
Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Rev-
enue 278-79 (2012) (GAO-12-342SP), available at https://www.gao.gov/
assets/590/588818.pdf.
7. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Donald Elliott, Air Pollution “Rights,” N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 11, 1982, at 23:
The E.P.A. should, instead, sell polluters the right to dirty the air 
for a fixed period—just as the Government now auctions off oil 
and gas leases to the highest bidders. If polluters were forced to pay, 
they would clean up to avoid the cost—and breathers, not industry, 
would profit. The public would not stand for a multi-billion dollar 
give-away of public lands or water to industry. Why should the air 
be different?
8. Bruce A. Ackerman et al., The Uncertain Search for Environmental 
Quality (1974).
9. This is not the place to debate the role that human activities play in caus-
ing climate change, or what priority should be given to addressing climate 
change in national policy. The point of this Comment is a narrower one: to 
Author’s Note: An earlier version of this Comment was presented at 
the University of Michigan Environmental Law and Policy Program 
Symposium “Planet in Peril: Averting Climate Catastrophe Through 
Law and Social Change” on April 11-12, 2019, and at the Yale 
Law School faculty workshop on April 22, 2019. Duke University 
Law School Prof. Jonathan Wiener also provided helpful comments 
on an earlier draft. I thank the commenters, but of course I am 
solely responsible for the errors, omissions, and opinions that remain. 
The opinions expressed are those of the author personally and do not 
reflect the positions of any organization or client; the author further 
states that he has not represented any client on matters related to the 
content of the Comment.
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capital asset for another that is more carbon-intensive; 
uncertainty about the future price for releasing a ton of 
carbon into the air distorts decisions about everything 
from buying a new car to building a new power plant.
To those skeptics who say that the Donald Trump 
Administration would never impose a carbon charge, I 
have two responses: (1) they will not be in office forever; 
and (2) politics makes strange bedfellows. As the tide to 
ban or greatly restrict fossil fuel use rises, it will become 
increasingly attractive to the fossil fuel industry and its 
allies in government to keep fossil fuel use legal by taxing 
it, which essentially makes the government a partner. That 
is what happened with cigarettes.10
For example, the leading contender for the Democratic 
nomination for president in 2020, Joe Biden, recently pro-
posed to ban fracking over 10 years.11 As someone who 
has advised five presidential campaigns on environmental 
issues, I doubt that Mr. Biden fully understood that this 
proposal amounts to a ban on most new oil wells in the 
United States, which is currently the world’s leading pro-
ducer of petroleum, as about 70% of both oil and gas wells 
are currently “fracked.”12 But be that as it may, the mere fact 
that the leading Democratic presidential candidate, who is 
currently ahead of President Trump in the polls, is endors-
ing such a sweeping restriction on fossil fuel production 
suggests that a fee on releases of carbon to the atmosphere 
may quickly become an attractive “second-best” solution 
from the perspective of large fossil fuel producers. And 
everybody’s second-best alternative frequently gets enacted 
into legislation or promulgated as an administrative rule.13 
Unlike a virtual ban on new drilling in the United Sates, 
a user fee on carbon would only have a marginal effect on 
the major producers of petroleum by making their product 
marginally more expensive versus substitutes, and it would 
allow for continued use in applications, such as jet fuel 
for air travel, for which petroleum currently has distinct 
advantages over available substitutes.
Unfortunately, since 1990, EPA has been laboring 
under the misimpression that it may not impose an emis-
sion charge without specific authorizing legislation from 
the extent that EPA decides to address GHGs, or other air pollutants, it may 
impose emission charges for regulatory purposes under existing legislation.
10. Stephanie Saul, Government Gets Hooked on Tobacco Tax Billions, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/
weekinreview/31saul.html.
11. Susan Crabtree, Trump Campaign Spotlights Biden’s Vow to Ban Fossil Fu-
els, RealClear Pol., Aug. 1, 2019, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/ar-
ticles/2019/08/01/trump_campaign_spotlights_bidens_vow_to_ban_fos-
sil_fuels__140916.html.
12. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Hydraulically Fractured Horizon-
tal Wells Account for Most New Oil and Natural Gas Wells, Today in Energy, 
Jan. 30, 2018, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34732.
13. See generally E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: 
The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 313 (1985) 
(describing how the automobile industry switched from opposing federal 
regulation of its products to supporting federal regulation in an attempt 
to head off a rising tide of state regulation, including proposals to ban the 
internal combustion engine in California and Pennsylvania), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/147/.
the U.S. Congress.14 This conclusion is based largely on a 
1990 legal opinion by the present author, then serving as 
EPA General Counsel, which held that EPA could impose a 
tradable permit program by interpretation, but not a tax.15 
As the Agency’s chief legal officer, EPA’s General Counsel 
is empowered to issue legal interpretations that are bind-
ing on the Agency’s program offices unless overturned by 
either a superior legal authority, such as the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, the courts, or a subsequent EPA General 
Counsel. Unfortunately, my 1990 legal opinion has been 
reiterated and expanded by several generations of Office of 
General Counsel (OGC) lawyers, but the conclusion that 
EPA may impose trading programs but not fees by inter-
pretation is wrong—or at least radically incomplete—and 
needs to be reexamined.
Ironically, the purpose of my 1990 legal memo to the 
Administrator and all the other Assistant Administrators 
running the program offices, including the air program, 
was to encourage EPA to use economic incentive systems 
more frequently under existing statutory authority. The 
opinion began by noting that many academics recom-
mended increased use of economic incentive systems, and 
concluded that under the Agency’s broad Chevron author-
ity, “if a statute does not explicitly preclude an incentivew-
based approach, EPA probably has the legal authority to 
use a system of economic incentives (such as marketable 
permits) as a mechanism for regulating pollution.” It then 
went on to review several precedents upholding EPA’s use 
of economic incentive systems where statutes were phrased 
in general terms, but ended with the cautionary note 
that “[i]t may be more difficult to regulate using fees, as 
opposed to tradable allocations, due to problems with the 
general doctrine that agencies may not use outside moneys 
to ‘supplement appropriations.’”
Unfortunately, that cautionary last sentence has been 
misinterpreted by subsequent generations of OGC law-
yers as meaning that EPA may never impose emission fees, 
which is incorrect. What you call something often matters 
a lot in Washington, and, unfortunately, economists gener-
ally call Pigouvian emission fees “pollution taxes.”16 Under 
the key U.S. Supreme Court case in the area, National 
14. Adele Morris of the Brookings Institution has suggested that EPA might 
impose a fee on carbon emissions, but through the indirect approach of 
requiring the states to do so. See Brad Plumer, Could the EPA Push a Carbon 
Tax on Its Own? Maybe—Here’s How, Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 2013, https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/11/15/could-the-epa-push- 
a-carbon-tax-on-its-own-maybe-with-this-weird-trick/. However, the article 
goes on to state incorrectly that “[i]f [states] refused, the EPA can’t impose 
taxes on its own.” Id.
15. Memorandum from E. Donald Elliott, supra note 4.
16. Congressional Research Service, supra note 1, at 2:
In the context of carbon price policy, terminology may be a key 
issue. As many policymakers, stakeholders, and academic journals 
use the term carbon tax, this is the default term in this report. Re-
lated terms cited in economic literature include emissions fee or 
emissions charge. Several proposals in recent Congresses described 
their approach as a GHG emissions fee. . . . The choice of termi-
nology between a tax and fee may have procedural consequences, 
particularly in terms of congressional committee jurisdiction. . . . In 
addition, there may be legal considerations depending on whether 
the program is structured as a fee or tax.
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Cable Television Ass’n v. United States,17 a strong presump-
tion exists against concluding that Congress has delegated 
its power to tax to an administrative agency.
But charges for disposing of polluting gases into the 
public’s air are not properly considered a tax, but rather a 
user fee. Under the Independent Offices Appropriation Act 
(IOAA),18 all agencies including EPA have been granted 
authority by Congress to charge user fees and keep the 
money to make their programs “self-sustaining” or rebate 
some of it to the Treasury if the money collected is more 
than they need, without offending the Anti-Deficiency 
Act.19 Under that latter statute, officers or employees of 
the United States may not obligate or expend in excess of 
appropriations, which was the concern mentioned in the 
final cautionary sentence in the legal opinion quoted in 
the Appendix.
17. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
18. Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877, 1051 (1982) (codified at 31 U.S.C. 
§9701).
19. 31 U.S.C. §1341(a).
The same Supreme Court case that holds that agencies 
may not impose taxes, National Cable Television Ass’n,20 
also holds that under the IOAA, agencies do have authority 
delegated from Congress to impose user fees, as opposed to 
taxes. And that same statute also provides that the moneys 
that they collect as user fees are not an illegal supplementa-
tion of their appropriations, which was what concerned me 
in the last sentence of the legal opinion. Unfortunately, I 
was woefully ignorant of the IOAA and related jurispru-
dence when I wrote the 1990 legal opinion.21
An extensive legal literature exists on the difference 
between taxes and user fees. According to the best aca-
demic review article on the subject, the essence of the 
distinction is that “[a] user fee is a price charged by a gov-
ernment agency for a service or product whose distribu-
tion it controls,” whereas a tax is intended to benefit the 
citizenry generally.22 Justice William O. Douglas, writing 
for the Court in National Cable Television Ass’n, explained 
this key distinction this way: “A fee, however, is incident 
to a voluntary act, e.g., a request that a public agency per-
mit an applicant to practice law or medicine or construct 
a house or run a broadcast station. . . . A ‘fee’ connotes a 
benefit.  .  .  .”23 The Office of Management and Budget’s 
(OMB’s) guidance on the IOAA states that it applies to 
“all Federal activities that convey special benefits to recipi-
ents beyond those accruing to the general public,” and that 
one of the “objectives” of charging user fees is to “promote 
efficient allocation of the Nation’s resources by establishing 
charges for special benefits provided to the recipient that 
are at least as great as costs to the Government of providing 
the special benefits. . . .”24
Numerous states and localities already impose user fees 
for disposing of wastes.25 Why should dumping waste into 
the air be any different than dumping it on land or into a 
river? In the context of air pollution, a user fee is appropri-
ate because the government “controls . . . the distribution 
of the product or service”26; it is allowing the polluter the 
special benefit of using the public’s air for waste disposal 
purposes; and the polluter is engaged in the voluntary act 
of polluting the air. To those who might object that pol-
luting the air is a right, not a “special benefit” conferred by 
government, I would remind them that at least since the 
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency,27 the federal government has 
had clear authority to restrict access to the air for purposes 
of disposing of GHGs; by allowing polluters to use the air 
20. Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, 415 U.S. 336.
21. “No one who cannot rejoice in the discovery of his own mistakes deserves to 
be called a scholar.” Donald Foster, Quote of the Day, N.Y. Times, June 20, 
2002.
22. Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 795, 800 (1987).
23. Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, 415 U.S. at 340-41.
24. OMB Circular No. A-25 Revised (July 8, 1993), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/omb/circulars_a025/.
25. See, e.g., Otsego County, New York, Solid Waste User Fee, https://www.ot-
segocounty.com/departments/solid_waste/solid_waste_user_fee.php (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2019).
26. Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 22, at 800.
27. 549 U.S. 497, 37 ELR 20075 (2007).
31 U.S.C. §9701. Fees and Charges for 
Government Services and Things of Value:
(a) It is the sense of Congress that each service or 
thing of value provided by an agency (except a 
mixed-ownership Government corporation) to a 
person (except a person on official business of the 
United States Government) is to be self-sustain-
ing to the extent possible.
(b) The head of each agency (except a mixed-
ownership Government corporation) may pre-
scribe regulations establishing the charge for a 
service or thing of value provided by the agency. 
Regulations prescribed by the heads of executive 
agencies are subject to policies prescribed by the 
President and shall be as uniform as practicable. 
Each charge shall be—
(1) fair; and
(2) based on—
(A) the costs to the Government;
(B)  the value of the service or thing to 
the recipient;
(C) public policy or interest served; and
(D) other relevant facts.
(c)  This section does not affect a law of the United 
States—
(1) prohibiting the determination and collec-
tion of charges and the disposition of those 
charges; and
(2) prescribing bases for determining charges, 
but a charge may be redetermined under this 
section consistent with the prescribed bases.
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for this purpose, the government is conferring a special 
benefit on them for which it is entitled to impose a user fee 
if it so chooses.
It is not unusual that resources are initially held in com-
mon with a right of free access by all comers, but government 
later gains legal authority to control access and charges user 
fees.28 For example, consider the electromagnetic spectrum: 
until the 1912 federal Radio Act,29 anyone could broad-
cast over the public’s air; today, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) charges user fees and auctions 
off spectrum use.30 It is long past time to recognize that, 
like governmental permission to broadcast over the public’s 
air, governmental permission to pollute the public’s air is a 
privilege granted by government, not a right.31
At what level should a user fee for polluting be set? Jas-
per Cummings, a tax practitioner at Alston & Bird, sug-
gests that as a general matter a user fee should “reasonably 
approximate the payer’s fair share of the costs incurred by 
the government in providing the benefit.”32 Admittedly, 
a fee based on the “social cost of carbon,” an estimate of 
the full cost of pollution to society as a whole,33 would not 
“approximate the fair share of costs incurred by govern-
ment” to provide the benefit conferred, which is govern-
mental permission to produce a good or service in a way 
that releases pollution into the public’s air. Ideally, a Pigou-
vian emission charge should approximate the harm to soci-
ety as a whole from providing the benefit of cheap disposal 
to the polluter, not just cover the costs to the government.
However, under the IOAA, the cost to the government 
is not a mandatory requirement for the definition of a user 
fee under subsection (a), but rather only one of the factors 
to be considered among others in setting the amount of the 
user fee under subsection (b). The IOAA provides that user 
fees should be established taking into consideration not 
28. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968).
29. 37 Stat. 302 (1912).
30. FCC, FY 2019 Regulatory Fees, https://www.fcc.gov/licensing-databases/
fees/regulatory-fees (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
31. See generally Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 19 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 227 
(2001) (arguing that government as trustee for the public has an obligation 
to charge for tradable pollution rights). For a sophisticated account of the 
legal history of the transition to the modern understanding that the air is 
public property, see Daniel H. Cole, Property Creation by Regulation: Rights 
to Clean Air and Rights to Pollute, in Property in Land and Other Re-
sources 125 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., Lincoln Institute of 
Land Policy 2012), available at https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/
files/pubfiles/property-creation-rights-clean-air-pollute_0.pdf.
32. Jasper L. Cummings Jr., User Fees Versus Taxes, Audit + Beyond, Oct. 31, 
2011, https://taxprof.typepad.com/files/62st0321.pdf.
33. U.S. EPA, The Social Cost of Carbon: Estimating the Benefits of Reducing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climat-
echange/social-cost-carbon_.html (last updated Jan. 9, 2017).
only “the costs to the Government,” but also based on “the 
value of the service or thing to the recipient” and “public 
policy or interest served.”34 The latter two statutory factors 
counsel in favor of “leveling the playing field” by charging 
polluters the full social costs for their use of the public’s air 
for disposal purposes, as opposed to their competitors who 
produce equivalent goods and services without, or at lower 
levels of, emissions.
If EPA wanted to be conservative and proceed step by 
step, it could begin by imposing a pollution charge based 
on an estimate of the incremental cost to the federal gov-
ernment attributable to the type of pollution in question. 
This could, for example, include additional Medicare costs 
and disaster relief efforts for hurricanes and other extreme 
events attributable to climate change as well as the costs 
of the air program. A rough precedent is provided by the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990,35 which provides that the party 
responsible for an oil spill into waters of the United States 
must reimburse the federal government for its costs in 
responding to the spill, as well as state and local govern-
ments for the additional costs of public services resulting 
from the spill.36
Eventually, however, there is a good chance that a fee 
based on the full social costs of pollution to the public as 
a whole, not just the government, could be sustained as 
a user fee rather than a tax. Prof. Hugh D. Spitzer calls 
these kinds of user fees “burden offset charges,” and argues 
they are an attractive alternative to traditional regulation 
to internalize costs on those responsible for creating a prob-
lem that imposes costs on the public, including air pollu-
tion as well as garbage and wastewater.37
It is long past time that emission charges should take 
their rightful place in EPA’s toolbox of instruments avail-
able to regulate pollution, including GHG pollution.
34. 31 U.S.C. §9701(b).
35. 33 U.S.C. §§2701-2761, ELR Stat. OPA §§1001-7001.
36. Id. §2702(a)(1), (b)(2)(F).
37. Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confusion, 38 Gonz. L. Rev. 335, 
345-47 (2002/2003).
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Appendix. 1990 Legal Opinion on Economic Incentives
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